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This working paper capitalizes on EU-LISTCO’s analytical framework 
to explore the influence of migration and radicalization on risks 
created by areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) 
in the Eastern Neighbourhood (EN). The paper argues that EN is 
characterized both by ALS and CO and examines the possibility of 
governance breakdown and violent conflict in the context of migration 
and radicalization processes. Currently, countries like Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine experience internal and external problems due 
to unresolved conflicts, corruption, or state capture. On the other hand, 
such issues often play out in a political arena among different political, 
economic, and societal actors with frequent involvement by external 
powers, especially the Russian Federation. Based on this analysis and 
methodology, we argue that neither migration nor radicalization in the 
EN will lead to governance breakdown or violent conflict in the EU 
neighbourhood in short- or medium-term time horizons. Although 
eventual escalation of radicalism to extremism or massive irregular 
migration from the EN could bring negative effects for the EU 
stabilization, countries in the EN region have sufficient components of 
societal resilience in place to avoid becoming a danger to the EU’s 
security. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
This working paper will analyse the impact of radicalization and migration 
on areas of limited statehood (ALS) and contested orders (CO) in the European 
Union’s Eastern Neighbourhood (EN). Both ALS and CO are considered risks 
factors that can affect the internal and external environment of the EU. The 
research will help to understand the possibility of these two risk factors 
becoming threats by causing governance breakdown and violent conflicts in 
the EN and how the EU can mitigate these risks. It tries to answer the 
question: how do radicalization and migration affect ALS/CO in Eastern 
Neighbourhood countries? 
Risks are considered and classified in terms of the effect of specific risk 
factors which influence the society (Borucka and Ostaszewski 2008). 
According to Börzel and Risse (2018: 4–6), ALS and CO are also risk factors 
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which represent challenges for the external action of the EU and its member 
states. ALS are situations when central government authorities and 
institutions are too weak to set and enforce rules and/or do not have the 
ability to fully control violence. These areas characterize large portions of the 
regions surrounding the EU in the east and in the south. However, ALS are 
neither ungoverned nor ungovernable, and we can find both territorial ALS 
(like Donbas, Transnistria, Abkhazia or South Ossetia) and sectoral ALS (like 
state capture and other vulnerabilities). CO are areas in which state and non-
state actors challenge the norms, principles, and rules of the organization of 
societies and political systems. In addition, each risk category can bring 
specific “tipping points” or “threshold[s] at which risks turn into threats” 
(Eickhoff and Stollenwerk 2018) and turn ALS and CO into governance 
breakdown and/or violent conflict. Researchers argue that “tipping points” 
can be understood either as moments triggering governance breakdown or 
violent conflict related to short-term mechanisms or as processes with long-
term and potential factors that may trigger governance breakdown or violent 
conflict (Magen et al. 2019). At the same time, these moments are not due to a 
single problem but are triggered by complex issues and a mixture of 
variables, e.g., radicalization with irregular migration combined. 
The EN is characterized both by ALS and CO which provide the fractious 
conditions for violence and governance breakdowns (Kakachia and Lebanidze 
2020). Currently, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine all experience both 
territorial and sectoral ALS due to unresolved conflicts (Waal and Twickel 
2020; Tkach 1999; Legucka 2017) and systemic problems like corruption or 
state capture (Capasso et al. 2020). CO, on the other hand, often play out in a 
political arena among different political, economic, and societal actors with 
frequent involvement by external powers (Cornell 2001). The severity of 
impacts on governance produced by the presence of CO can vary from total 
governance breakdown (Georgia in the 1990s) to violent protests (Ukraine in 
2014) to peaceful electoral revolutions (Georgia in 2003, Ukraine in 2004, 
Moldova 2009) (Horowitz 2003). Also, powers such as Russia put the regional 
order into question. Russia is directly responsible for the continuing presence 
of regional ALS, such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, the Crimea, 
and Donbas (Asmus 2010; Talbott and Tennis 2019; Galeotti 2019). Currently, 
the Donbas region represents the most dangerous zone of conflict where 
military skirmishes have never fully abated since 2014 (Babak 2020). The 
challenge for EU foreign policy is to foster conditions in which challenges to 
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these orders remain peaceful and do not contribute to governance 
breakdowns and violent conflict in the surrounding. 
This working paper analyses the issues of migration and radicalization and 
their influence on risks created by ALS/CO as well as the possibility of 
governance breakdown and violent conflict in the EN. The focus will be on 
selected EN countries—Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova—applying the case 
study and empirical research methods. The main problem with governing risk 
is to discover the level of risk and find ways to mitigate it (Marjolein and 
Ortwin 2011). Risks created by ALS/CO do not always become real threats to 
European security. Whether this happens depends on the extent to which 
resilient societies in EN successfully contain these risks through effective and 
legitimate governance. This is why the European Commission highlights the 
role of societal resilience, defined as “the capacity of societies, communities 
and individuals to manage opportunities and risks in a peaceful and stable 
manner, and to build, maintain or restore livelihoods in the face of major 
pressures” (European Commission and High Representative of the Union for 
Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2017: 3). Hence resilience needs to be 
considered within a broader perspective (Eickhoff and Stollenwerk 2018) as a 
large-scale state-building and governance solution on many levels. In other 
words, resilience affects tipping points in such a way that it mitigates the 
effects of the risks and prevents governance breakdown and violent conflict 
(Ibid.). To make a risk and resilience perspective more useful to practitioners, 
we consider that societal resilience has three dimensions—social trust, 
legitimacy and institutional design (Börzel and Risse 2018).  
Based on this analysis and methodology, we argue that neither migration nor 
radicalization in the EN will lead to governance breakdown or violent conflict 
in the EU neighbourhood in short- or mid-term time horizons. Although 
eventual escalation of radicalism to extremism or massive irregular 
migration from the EN could bring negative effects for the EU stabilization, 
we argue that they do not yet pose direct threats to European security. The 
remainder of this paper will analyse actual, probable, and potential impacts of 
migration and radicalization on risks created by ALS/CO. In the next section, 
we examine the relation between radicalization and migration and their 
influence on violent conflict or governance breakdown, and illustrate the 
extent to which societal resilience-building has become practice in Georgia, 
Moldova, and Ukraine. In section 3, we first map radicalization in Georgia, 
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Moldova, and Ukraine by analysing key factors of this phenomenon in those 
countries. We then examine the impact of migration on ALS/CO in the EN. We 
conclude by reflecting on the implications of our findings for policy and 
practice. We argue that societal resilience in the EN has in many cases had a 
positive effect in preventing the spread of military conflicts throughout the 
countries studied and the neighbouring region. The most important element 
of societal resilience in the EN appears to be the interpersonal and individual 
trust that was so helpful in supporting governance during times of crisis (e.g., 
the work of volunteers during revolutions or by delivering aid to the armies 
during Russian aggressions in Georgia or Ukraine) and, in the case of 
migration, in remitting money to the families in Moldova, Ukraine, and 
Georgia crucial for the economies of those countries.  
2. RADICALIZATION, MIGRATION, AND RESILIENCE IN THE EN 
In this section, the paper discusses how radicalization and migration impact 
risks created by local ALS/CO, and to what extent local components of societal 
resilience can offset these risks. Risks in the EU’s neighbourhoods may pose a 
serious danger to its security and internal stability, but only if they 
deteriorate and turn into violent conflict and/or governance breakdown 
(Börzel and Risse 2018). In the EN, however, societal resilience may be 
sufficient for the time being to mitigate the effects of the risks and prevent 
governance breakdown and violent conflict. 
In the EN, high levels of social inequality coupled with widespread poverty, 
high rates of unemployment, and the presence of rent-seeking elites all create 
conditions for social and political radicalization and in some cases 
extremism. In order to methodologically locate the radicalization 
phenomenon in this context, several differences between radicalism and 
extremism must be noted. The tendency that leads to violence or governance 
breakdown is extremism, which in the literature is often confused with 
radicalism and radicalization. Previous findings have shown that the terms 
radicalism and radicalization indicate a political disposition and a political 
process whereby, in the rejection of rule (by, e.g., authoritarian regimes), 
actors and groups come to accept pragmatic and selective use of violence in 
the pursuit of political goals (Bicchi et al. 2020; Krastev 2014). Thus, in the 
political context, a radical is someone who desires an extreme change of part 
or all of the social order and may use some extreme methods to achieve this. 
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Unlike extremists, however, radicals tend not look to past glory, as their goal 
is a future for all, usually advocating emancipation and universal human 
rights (Bicchi et al. 2020). Extremists, in contrast, espouse violence on 
principle and thus cannot be integrated into democratic societies because 
their ideology is based on rejection of democracy, rule of law, and universal 
human rights (Bötticher 2017: 74–75). In Ukraine and Georgia, for instance, 
some groups of radicals have been integrated into political life, and that is 
why they did not follow an extremist ideology.  
Regarding migration, mechanisms which can lead to governance breakdown 
or violent conflict are irregular and forced migration (Bicchi et al. 2020). In 
the EN, the most massive migrations trends are irregular, economic, and 
forced migration (in particular of internally displaced persons, or IDPs). 
Regions which experience high net migration loss are predominantly 
borderlands, mountainous with harsh climates, agricultural, and/or suffering 
dramatic declines in key industries (Bélorgey et al. 2012). Migration leads to 
further changes in societies, including lack of labour force, high youth 
unemployment, increased mobility of terrorist groups, and arms smuggling. 
For example, rural emigration has negatively affected the development and 
reproduction of educational quality and the provision of healthcare services. 
Some countries (such as Moldova and Ukraine) report severe shortages of 
teaching staff in rural areas and consequent growing inequalities in quality of 
and access to education, and an absence of community-based social and 
healthcare services as a result of low salaries. However, these problems do not 
directly trigger violent conflict or governance breakdown: in the short-term, 
the potential risks are mitigated by the very nature of migration (legal, 
circular, and seasonal) and its positive impact on the Ukrainian economy 
(revenues from remittances in 2019 were about $12 billion) (Capasso et al. 
2020; Jaroszewicz 2018). Nevertheless, migration can be understood as a 
process that raises both opportunities and challenges for countries and 
societies (Castle and Miller 2009). In the long run, negative demographic and 
migration trends in the region may trigger violence and governance 
breakdown, in particular in local ALS, which are disproportionately affected 
by both international and internal migration and displacement, and if or 
where this becomes an increasing factor in local CO. The scale of the process is 
lower than that to the EU’s South (Frontex 2020). Nevertheless, it also raises 
several problems within Eastern European countries and outside. In this 
paper, we concentrate on the consequences of migration that potentially can 
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increase risk or present a challenge. We do not examine the positive effects on 
social mobility, which “has a critical role to play in strengthening Eastern 
partners’ resilience” (Petrova and Delcour 2020: 348). 
The negative effects of radicalization or illegal migration noted above can be 
mitigated by societal resilience, preventing risks from turning into threats 
leading to violent conflict or governance breakdown in ALS or CO. We argue 
that societal resilience does not necessarily have to be provided by state 
institutions but can also occur through local governance as well as non-state 
actors. For example, when the Ukrainian state and its structures proved weak 
in the face of the “little green men” problem (Russian troops in unmarked 
uniforms) in Crimea and against Russian aggression in the east of the 
country, Ukrainian society self-organized, i.e., through the formation of 
“committees”, in support of the national army. According to Madoian (2020: 7):  
Since the eruption of conflict, civic engagement in and around Donbas 
has become more dynamic. Local activists have been the main 
guardians of a Ukrainian identity and allied with the government to 
support humanitarian efforts and mitigate the effects of war. 
Civil society organizations in smaller communities urged local 
administrations to address the most pressing long-standing problems. For 
instance, an NGO in the town of Druzhkivka engaged with local authorities to 
make local infrastructure more accessible to people with disabilities (ibid.). 
Such actions proved a bottom-up logic to peace and governance and allowed 
for long-term consolidation of essential governance provision for states and 
societies (Eickhoff and Stollenwerk 2018). Based on empirical exploration of 
reciprocal interaction between resilience, risks, and the role of external actors 
in Georgia and Ukraine, we can draw a broad conclusion, that those countries 
show a basic quality of domestic resilience able to withstand risks created by 
ALS/CO and prevent the emergence of violent conflicts or governance 
breakdown.  
Social trust has been a key source of resilience in the EN. Still, generalized 
trust in the EN is rather low (23.1% in Ukraine, 8.8% in Georgia and 17.6% in 
Moldova) (World Values Survey Association 2020), and this is connected with 
risks associated with ALS/CO because people are not willing to support states’ 
policies and are less active in political and social life, which weakens those 
states internally and externally. The generally low level of legitimacy of 
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political institutions may be a legacy of the post-Soviet period, when political 
institutions were ineffective and there was a general lack of good governance. 
At the same time, inter-personal trust is high (above 60%) (Kyiv International 
Institute of Sociology 2018). Trust in groups of unfamiliar people turned out 
to be of utmost importance in Ukraine during the initial phase of the Russian 
aggression, when volunteer movements provided financing for the basic 
needs of the Armed Forces and volunteer battalions operating on the frontline 
and, therefore, provided military capacity in the absence of effective state 
mechanisms. In fact, both the Orange Revolution of 2004–2005 and the 
Revolution of Dignity of 2013–2014 proved the high capacity of Ukrainian 
society for self-organization, which made up for the distrust in state 
institutions.  
Empirical legitimacy, which concerns the social acceptance of the existing 
governance structures (Börzel and Risse 2018) by different actors and 
institutions among the local population is directly related to the political 
culture of EN societies. EN citizens’ political identity and culture are largely 
conditioned by the dominance of a post-soviet model of governance and 
society-government relations, leading to belief in a top-down logic and 
expectations that state or elite non-state actors will provide solutions. The 
level of acceptance and trust in the government among the societies in the EN 
is rather low, and the one way citizens express their discontent is by voting 
‘with their feet’ and emigrating. The low legitimacy of public institutions is 
also due to the still high levels of corruption, informality, and state capture, 
resulting in the disproportional enrichment of business-political elites. As a 
consequence of the corruption, people do not believe that state actors 
(government, parliament, or president) can help them solve their problems. 
Among the non-state actors, the Orthodox churches enjoy a high degree of 
popular support (above 60% in Georgia and Ukraine, and above 80% in 
Moldova) (Caucasus Research Centre 2018; Razumkov Centre 2020). 
Ukrainians see the primary role of the Church as defending the interests of 
the poorest citizens, especially when the government makes decisions that 
lower people’s standard of living. They also view religion as strengthening 
people’s morality and helping to revive national identity and culture 
(Razumkov Centre 2020). In this regard, the Church constitutes an important 
instrument of strengthening societal resilience, and the establishment of the 
new Orthodox Church of Ukraine, which was granted autocephaly in 2019, 
increased the public role of the Church. However, there have been cases of 
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priests of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church Moscow Patriarchate openly 
advocating against the Ukrainian state and declaring their support for the 
Russian aggression against Ukraine, which shows that religion (in this case, 
two competing factions) can both shape public opinion and contribute to the 
weakening of societal resilience. 
Of utmost importance when considering radicalization and migration issues 
in the EN has been the third component of resilience, namely institutional 
design, which is connected to set rules (both formal and informal) (Börzel and 
Risse 2018). For instance, in Ukraine the state has quite effectively controlled 
radicalization, partly through co-option mechanisms and partly due to the 
creation of new institutions; for example, the Ministry of Veterans Affairs 
was established in 2018 to ensure the formation and implementation of state 
policy in the field of social protection of war veterans. Regarding migration, 
EN countries tend to lack a systematic state approach (Jaroszewicz and 
Kaźmierkiewicz 2014). For example, although Georgia has introduced a state 
system of assistance and management of IDPs, this is based on developing 
legal norms in line with UNHCR priorities. The effectiveness of this system is 
equally dependent on the international financial support to Georgia in this 
field. In the event of a collapse of this assistance or a significant limitation of 
external financing, IDPs, who are still not fully integrated into society, may 
become a challenge for the Georgian authorities, necessitating an effective 
and self-sufficient IDP-focused policy which could seriously increase the 
budget load. In Ukraine, migration is barely managed in any way, despite 
some attempts to do so by the state; in 2010, the State Migration Service was 
established, and in 2017, the document “Strategy of the state migration policy 
of Ukraine until 2025” was adopted. Nevertheless, the state has little influence 
on immigration flows. One of the main tools is the “Migration profile of 
Ukraine”, published every year as a collection of analytical and statistical 
information on migration in Ukraine. The report started within the 
framework of Ukraine's implementation of the EU Visa Liberalization Action 
Plan for Ukraine. Still, the lack of state control is compensated by other 
factors, such as the circular and short-term nature of the migration itself and 
remittances, which constitute an important part of Ukrainian GDP (about 9% 
or $12 billion in 2019) (National Bank of Ukraine 2020). Worth also 
emphasizing is the role of social remittances—practices, identities, and social 
capital—that are transferred from migrants to their home countries (White 
and Grabowska 2019). Social remittances can be even more important than 
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financial ones where they play an important role in strengthening resilience; 
migrants may acquire new ideas, practices, values, norms, and beliefs which 
can induce social change and be a means to modernization. On the other 
hand, migration can also undermine social trust because of the separation of 
family and social group members, which can weaken social bonds. 
The EU’s role in strengthening resilience in the EN is observed mainly in the 
institutional field (Open Society Foundation Kyiv 2016). In Ukraine, for 
example, some important institutional changes took place under pressure 
from international actors, including the EU, such as establishing the National 
Anticorruption Bureau and introducing an electronic system of asset 
declarations for officials and politicians. These aimed at limiting corruption 
opportunities and therefore at increasing government legitimacy. 
Nevertheless, anticorruption activities have met with fierce resistance from 
some in the political elite afraid of revealing their illegal activities and 
reducing future profits (Kościński and Szeligowski 2017). The key to fighting 
corruption in Ukraine remains the still unfinished reform of the justice 
system, which still makes it possible for corrupt judges and prosecutors to 
sabotage anti-corruption actions in their final stage. Although the judicial 
system has been subject to some change since the Revolution of Dignity, such 
as the introduction of a new three-tier system of courts, restricting judicial 
immunity, and launching a procedure for the evaluation of judges, this has 
not decisively affected the old practices. 
Thus, while processes radicalization and migration in the EN have the 
potential to contribute to a tipping point at which governance breakdown or 
violent conflict may emerge, in particular in contexts affected by ALS/CO, it 
seems for the moment that countries in the region have sufficient 
components of societal resilience in place to avoid becoming a danger to the 
EU’s security and internal stability. 
3. RADICALIZATION AND MIGRATION IN THE EN: A CASE STUDY 
In this section, we discuss the main empirical findings on the extent to which 
radicalization and migration influence security and societal resilience in the 
EN. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, which can be characterized as a 
period of violence and destabilization, many people in this region expressed 
increased readiness for change concerning historical disputes, military 
conflicts, and the involvement of external actors, all of which weakened the 
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young post-Soviet states (Cornell 2001; Waal and Twickel 2020). ALS/CO in the 
EN have been most visible in Georgia and Moldova after the internal conflicts 
in the early 1990s and the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, and in Ukraine since 
the start of Russian aggression in 2014. Below, we provide a brief mapping of 
how resilience and migration impact risks associated with ALS/CO and their 
potential to trigger new conflicts or governance breakdowns in the EN.  
3.1. Radicalization  
This section will elaborate the risks arising from ALS/CO through the lens of 
radicalization. In the EN, there are several factors that facilitate the rise of 
radical groups. First, there are the many protracted conflicts, during which 
many of the fighting groups became extremists. Secondly, it is due to 
ideological elements fuelled from outside (chiefly by Russia or ISIS) and the 
rise of populism (Dolidze et al. 2018; Pokalova 2020). Thirdly, in the case of 
Ukraine in particular, there is a pre-existing disposition to use violence 
coupled with an informal integration of paramilitary groups into the state, 
including financing through corrupt businesses and connection to local law 
enforcement agencies (Curtis et al 2020).  
3.1.1. Georgia  
In Georgia’s case, radical groups arose in the early 1990s and have participated 
in all of its internal ethnic (Georgian-Abkhaz, Georgian-Ossetian) and political 
clashes (Georgian civil war) (Secrieru 2017). The Georgian conflicts attracted 
not only foreign fighters but also mobilized domestic radicals, such as the 
Mkhedrioni paramilitary units (existing between 1989 and 1995). Later, 
members of this group constituted a political party in Georgia which 
generated many political activists and continued functioning in Georgian 
politics for years afterwards. Most of these radicals came from Russia, and 
most were motivated by ethnic, nationalist, or religious reasons, though some 
also constituted mercenary groups for financial gain. Among the examples of 
these radicals were the various foreign fighter groups active in Georgia’s 
conflicts. A key characteristic of these groups was that they were not just 
present on one side of a given conflict (separatist or government) but 
influenced the conditions in the state as a whole, including corruption and 
criminalization (Kukhianidze 2009).  
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Furthermore, Georgia is a multicultural, multiethnic country (ethnic 
minorities make up 13.2% of the Georgian population) and the full-fledged 
inclusion of ethnic and religious minorities in Georgia's political, cultural and 
social life remains a challenge (Dolidze et al. 2018). Ethnic diversity has been a 
challenge for Georgian unity since gaining independence in 1991. The biggest 
examples of that were wars between Georgians, Abkhaz and Ossetians (finally 
ending with creation of two separatist republics, supported by Russia) and 
separatist movements in Adjara during the time of the rule of charismatic 
Aslan Abashidze, which ended peacefully). Because of these conflicts, 
however, Georgia became not only an ‘importer’ of foreign fighters but also 
an ‘exporter’ of them to other conflicts in the post-Soviet area (Transnistria, 
Nagorno-Karabakh, Ukraine) and the Middle East (the civil war in Lebanon, 
civil war/war in Syria, and also as fighters of the Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant, or ISIS) in Syria and Iraq, during the biggest foreign fighter 
mobilization in history between 2014 and 2017) (US Department of State 2017; 
Pokalova 2020). The Georgian experience with foreign fighters, both inside 
and outside the country, is strictly related to its internal security challenges, 
such as extremist attacks and radicalization of young Georgian Muslims i.e., 
in Pankisi Gorge, were the “passivity of the government, a lack of 
communication, and low sensitivity to the community” pose problems that 
may become additional facilitators of radicalization (Dolidze et al. 2018: 8). 
Fighters entering the country have always caused more violent and sustained 
actions during conflicts, often exaggerating the brutality of military and 
paramilitary clashes. From the other side, Georgia has not created a workable 
policy for fighters returning from military conflicts abroad. Returning 
foreign fighters need a social and state political framework in terms of 
reconciliation and re-socialization (especially people with post-traumatic 
stress disorder, PTSD) or those who are not ready to give up the 
military/armed way of life) (Krikorian 2015; Pokalova 2018). In Georgia, 
radicalization has tended to increase in the last 2–3 years. Far-right groups 
even announced plans to form a joint party, the National Front, and that they 
would “take part in absolutely all political processes” (Gelashvili 2019: 1). 
Right-wing groups are indirectly supported, or at least not openly 
condemned, by the ruling party and other political actors, and extreme right-
wing opinions largely coincide with general public attitudes, meaning that 
there are significant discursive opportunities for mobilization (Gelashvili 
2019). Such groups represent anti-constitutional and anti-democratic attitudes 
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(Stephan 2018). The most well-known is Georgian Idea, a group that aligns 
itself with a religious base (in this case, Orthodox Christian) and advocates the 
reinstitution of a monarchy in Georgia and a ‘balanced’ foreign policy, 
implying closer relations with Russia and forgoing aspirations to join the EU 
and NATO. Other significant groups include Georgian March, Georgian 
National Unity, and Georgian Power. In contrast to Georgian Idea and 
Georgian March, which remain publicly active, Georgian National Unity and 
Georgian Power have recently moved to online activism (Svanidze 2018; 
Transparency International 2018). There are no indicators that right-wing 
actors in Georgia will become a consolidated and powerful movement. They 
remain small, fragmented, and relatively marginal and do not pose for now 
an important factor in order contestation, but in the long-term it is “necessary 
to address the political opportunities that enable mobilization in the first 
place. This includes both discursive opportunities and the potential access of 
right-wing extremists to the political space” (Gelashvili 2019: 9).  
To summarize, we can identify numerous domestic and external factors in 
Georgia which, alone or in a combination, may lead to new violent 
contestations or governance breakdowns. They include a bundle of socio-
economic and political factors, but Georgia has continued its preventive 
efforts by focusing on initiatives in education, civic and political 
participation, media, and access to information, preserving minority culture 
and identity, justice and law-enforcement activities, and social and regional 
integration (US Department of State 2020). That is why radicalization in 
Georgia is not a main factor in risks created by ALS/CO in Georgia.  
3.1.2. Ukraine 
Likewise, there were more than 30 radical and paramilitary groups, including 
far-right ones, that took part in the hostilities in Donbas on the Ukrainian 
side. Among the most important were Right Sector, Azov Battalion, Aidar, 
Donbas, and Dnipro-1, which were volunteer battalions consisting of up to a 
few hundred individuals with their own chain of command, logistics, and 
funding, although on the frontline they cooperated closely with the Armed 
Forces of Ukraine and often relied on artillery support from the regular 
Ukrainian army (Käihkö 2018; Klein 2015). Their presence in Donbas was 
crucial at the initial stage of the Russian aggression, compensating for the 
deplorable condition of the army. However, on at least a few occasions, they 
also showed poor commitment and discipline, and later on, with only a few 
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exceptions, they were integrated into the official army structures. There were 
cases when some of these groups committed crimes and abuses, with 
probably the most notorious example being the Tornado battalion, which was 
disbanded by the Ukrainian authorities in June 2015 after it transformed itself 
into a de facto organized crime group (Miller 2016). Nevertheless, the 
Ukrainian authorities have so far been hesitant to investigate and prosecute 
extremist actions and crimes committed by the volunteer battalions, given 
their contribution to the war with Russia and high level of trust (over 50%) 
within the society (Razumkov Centre 2019).  
One radical group with connections to local law enforcement agencies is 
Oplot (“Stronghold”), which exemplifies many of the factors facilitating the 
rise of radical groups in the country. It started among those with a disposition 
to use violence, as a Mixed Martial Arts fight club. It was also financed 
through corrupt business practices, as its members were often employed to 
provide corporate security for questionable business activities. The group also 
developed connections to local law enforcement agencies; their leader, 
Yevhen Zhylin, had even been a former police officer, and the group 
cooperated with the police during Euromaidan, for instance, helping to 
transfer protesters to police stations (Coynash 2018). Oplot also promoted 
external ideological values; for instance, Zhylin came up with the initiative to 
erect a Soviet-style monument to Stalin in Kharkiv in 2013. Nevertheless, the 
group also seemed to enjoy informal and unofficial sanction by the Ukrainian 
authorities, who, during Yanukovych’s time, sought support from the radicals 
(Goujon and Shukan 2015), especially when the regime was constrained by 
laws and norms that made it impossible to enforce punishment and enact 
terror, or when the state lacked the capacity and manpower to act. 
Many radical groups had been financed and supported by Russia long before 
2014 and actively joined the ranks of the Russian-controlled forces in Donbas 
soon after the beginning of the aggression (Likhachev 2016). Oplot was one of 
the most notorious, with the former head of its Donetsk branch Oleksandr 
Zakharchenko becoming the self-declared leader of the so-called Donetsk 
People’s Republic (DPR) in 2014–2018. Numerous other Ukrainian radical and 
paramilitary groups, including Cossacks and other irregular military groups 
bearing “Orthodox” (adherent to the Russian Orthodox creed) names, also 
participated in the hostilities on the Russian side, committing war crimes in 
Donbas. There are several pro-Russia “security” groups, de facto mobile 
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paramilitary units that still exist in central and western Ukraine, mainly 
under the umbrella of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow 
Patriarchate, although Ukrainian experts believe these groups are closely 
monitored by the Ukrainian security services and the National Police 
(Coynash 2018; Szeligowski et al. 2019). 
The mobilization of volunteers in Ukraine was also combined with an influx 
of foreign fighters from abroad, on both sides of the conflict. Both the Russia-
backed separatists and pro-Ukraine forces facilitated that inflow with 
ideological calls and propaganda (particularly among the pro-Russia 
separatists and Russian forces) because of the weakness of their own forces 
(Ukraine) (Karagiannis 2016). What is extraordinary regarding this 
phenomenon is that many radicals involved in the conflict in Ukraine 
underlined their need for a life of combat rather than a political or ideological 
motivation. This led to the phenomenon of “neo-communists” and “neo-
Nazis” fighting arm-in-arm and contributed to the more extensive 
radicalization and brutalization of the conflict. 
Of particular concern for Ukraine are those radical groups that are issue-
driven and do not publicly adhere to any party ideology (Szeligowski et al. 
2019). An example of such a mixed and ad-hoc group is the radicals that 
initiated the trade blockade of the occupied territories in the Donetsk and 
Luhansk oblasts in spring 2017. These were not individuals affiliated with 
political parties but war veterans who won support for their case to “stop trade 
with the enemy” from a substantial part of the society and obliged the 
government, which opposed the action, to eventually approve their demands 
and permanently institute the blockade despite the certainty of economic 
losses (Kostanyan and Remizov 2017). Other less prominent examples include 
radical groups employed by oligarchs and business representatives, and 
sometimes also by organized crime groups, for illegal activities. Frequently, 
their tasks include asset-grabbing—the illicit acquisition of a business 
belonging to a competitor—or intimidation of their patrons’ opponents. 
However, there have been cases in which war veterans were employed as 
contract killers. A driving force for change in this respect could be the new 
Ministry for Veterans Affairs, established in November 2018 (titled the 
Ministry for Veterans Affairs, Temporarily Occupied Territories and 
Internally Displaced Persons since September 2019), yet it remains to be seen 
how effective the institution will be. 
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While not all Ukrainian radical groups and volunteer battalions are ideology-
driven, some of them are affiliated with right-wing political parties and 
organizations, and a few of their commanders even managed to enter 
parliament in the October 2014 elections, although as members of other 
political factions. No far-right party managed to pass the threshold at that 
time, and they largely remained outside the political mainstream, focusing on 
street marches. In March 2017, the leaders of three nationalist organizations—
Svoboda, National Corps (civil branch of the Azov battalion), and Right 
Sector—signed a joint political manifesto (Svoboda 2017) calling for the 
transformation of street actions into parliamentary politics. Support for the 
document was expressed by three other organizations—Congress of 
Ukrainian Nationalists, Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, and S14. 
However, they failed to prepare a joint platform or even put forward a single 
candidate for the March 2019 presidential elections. Notably, the link between 
political parties and street groups has been weak, and it may be the case that a 
strong political movement of the Ukrainian far-right will not emerge, 
especially given that the political weight of Svoboda, previously present in the 
Rada (in 2012–2014) as a separate faction, far exceeds that of other radical 
formations. As radical parties did not make it into parliament in the pre-term 
July 2019 elections, it is possible that the radicals will become marginalized, 
potentially escalating both their radicalization and the risk of violent order 
contestation, because parliamentary politics has turned out to be inaccessible 
to them. 
3.1.3. Moldova  
After the Russian invasion of Donbas in 2014, there were no skirmishes, 
unrest, or significant manifestation of support, even if pro-Russian sentiment 
is very strong, especially in autonomous Gagauzia, the city of Bălţi, and 
separatist Transnistria. Moldova was not a significant source of radical 
groups. This was caused by a combination of different factors. On the one 
hand, after the lost Transnistrian war in 1992, successive Moldovan 
governments have conducted a policy of moral disarmament, so the prestige 
of military service in the society is low. The Moldovan army now is small—
just about 4,000 personnel—but is also badly-equipped and poorly paid. 
Moldova could therefore not serve as an important reservoir of potential pro-
Russian combatants (mercenaries or volunteers) because of its very small 
number of military specialists or even people with basic military training 
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(Ziarul Naţional 2018). On the other, Transnistria—pro-Russian and highly 
militarized region—has also not been an important source of combatants. 
Ukraine sealed its own border with Moldova, especially the section with de 
facto Transnistria. Since the beginning of its existence, this region has been 
well penetrated by Ukrainian secret services. Also, after the outbreak of the 
Donbas war, Transnistrian authorities have tried to be transparent in their 
assurances to Ukraine that the region poses no risk. According to the 
Moldovan Security and Information Service (SIS), to 2018 only about 100 
Moldovan citizens had joined the forces of the so-called Donetsk and Luhansk 
Peoples Republics, although more than half of them were from Transnistria. 
As of July 2018, 18 of them had been arrested and 15 sentenced by Moldovan 
courts. Two others were sentenced in Ukraine. The main reason they cited for 
joining the war was to earn money; about 70% of them were unemployed or 
from poor families (Gaţcan 2018). According to some sources, the Moldovan 
mercenaries were paid about €300–€750 monthly (Sanduţa and Şevciuc 2018).  
However, Transnistria was an important source for a specific type of 
professional subversive agents—retired politicians and officials, high-
ranking military and security officers—about forty of whom were transferred 
by Russia to the Donbas and Luhansk region to organize and command local 
forces (Kramer 2014). The highest-ranking Transnistrians were Alexander 
Karaman—former vice-president of Transnistria and in 2014 vice-prime 
minister of social affairs and minister of foreign affairs of the DPR—and 
Vladimir Antyufeyev—former Transnistrian minister of state security and in 
2014 vice-prime minister of DPR state security (Atyufeyev also took part in a 
Russian coup and an annexation of Crimea). Other important figures from 
Transnistrian state security forces were Oleg Bereza and Andrey Pinchuk, 
who, in 2014–2015, were ministers of internal affairs and of state security of 
the DPR, respectively. 
A part of Moldovan society, especially members of national minorities and 
older people with post-Soviet mentality, recognizes unionist movement as 
radicals or extremists who are fighting against their own state. Unionists—
supporters of the idea of a union between Romania and Moldova—are a small 
but well-organized radical political movement. The unionist electorate is 
about 10–15%. But for now, in Parliament, there is no unionist party. The 
Liberal Party was the last unionist parliamentary faction, but was 
compromised by its cooperation with oligarch Vlad Plahotniuc and was not 
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elected in 2019. Popular support for the incorporation of Moldova into 
Romania has usually been reported at 15–20% but rose to 34% just after the fall 
of the pro-European Maia Sandu’s government in November 2019 
(Deschide.md 2019) and later to 44% in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic 
(Necşuţu 2021). This is because, for a significant part of society, Moldova lost 
legitimacy as a state, becoming an ALS. Trust in state institutions is very low 
among this group, who see the only chance for improvement of the political, 
social, and economic situation in liquidating the state by incorporation into 
Romania. This conviction has been strengthened by the COVID-19 pandemic, 
during which the Moldovan state has been absolutely inefficient and 
Romania has been the main donator of medical help (including vaccines) to 
Moldovan citizens. On the other hand, a significant part of Moldovan society, 
mainly national minorities and older Moldovans, who are still living with 
post-Soviet sentiments, are very hostile to Romania and consider unionists to 
be the real threat. The fight against the unionist movement is used by former 
President Igor Dodon and his Socialist Party to mobilize voters (Pieńkowski 
2018, 2020). 
To sum up, in the EN further radicalization and its transformation into 
extremism remains a moderate risk. At the moment, the activity of radical 
groups in political and economic life is now relatively low. One has to 
remember that radical marginalized groups have not reached Ukrainian, 
Georgian, or Moldovan parliaments, although they enjoy considerable 
influence on state institutions by means of mass protests, for instance. On the 
other hand, this is an effect of the fact that the radicalization threat in case of 
Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine is caused mainly by territorial losses (to an 
external actor, i.e., Russia) and conflicts which have been radicalising their 
societies. An additional factor increasing the possibility of CO is the fact that 
radical groups in Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine, regardless of whether they 
are tied to or inspired by Russia or are extremely anti-Russian, are inherently 
anti-democratic, even if they define themselves as democratic or sometimes 
more democratic that mainstream political forces (because they propose 
online voting, for instance). Radical far-right groups in Georgia and Ukraine 
have become extremely anti-Russian. On the other hand, pro-Russian 
“security” groups and de facto mobile paramilitary units (even if closely 
monitored by the Security Services) sometimes participate in hostilities on 
the Russian side, supporting separatists in Transnistria, Abkhazia/South 
Ossetia, and Donbas. Overall, even if anti-Russian radicalism is dominant at 
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the moment, especially in Georgia and Ukraine, a clash between these two 
types of CO (plus the Russian one itself) may increase the possibility of 
paramilitary confrontation. 
3.2. Migration  
Three dimensions of migration in the EN potentially increase the risks of 
governance breakdown or violent conflict related to ALS/CO. The first is 
internal displacement as a result of the protracted conflicts in Donbas, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh. The second 
is economic migration, which has involved about 3 million people from 
Ukraine (since 2014), 1 million from Moldova (since 1991), and 600,000 from 
Georgia each year, potentially leading to “brain drain”, when a significant 
portion of a country’s population of skilled or qualified workers become 
emigrants, leading to a significant loss of human capital (Fedyuk and Kindler 
2016: 42, 104–105). The third is the influx of foreign fighters to Ukraine and 
Georgia. Without improvement of the economic and social situation in the EN 
and an end to the regional conflicts, negative migration trends, i.e., IDPs, 
brain drain, and the influx of foreign figures, will continue. So far, the scale of 
these problems does not threaten governance breakdown or violent conflict. 
Additionally, in some cases economic migration is circular and has overall 
had positive effects and benefits for Ukraine and Georgia’s economies in 
particular. But there are possible areas which can in future exacerbate risks 
associated with ALS/CO: e.g., a lack of skilled workers, especially in health 
sector, or the unstable social and humanitarian situation of IDPs. Also, the 
lack of an effective migration policy and instruments supporting the return 
of EN economic migrants to their home countries will increase the risks 
arising from ALS/CO in the future. 
3.2.1. Georgia  
The bad economic and social situation in Georgia influences the negative 
elements of migration like brain drain, internal displacement, or influx of 
foreign fighters. The scale of these problems does not threaten governance 
breakdown or violent conflict, but the lack of an effective migration policy 
and instruments supporting the return of migrants to the country will 
increase the risks associated with ALS/CO in the future. 
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Migration is influenced by the risks created by ALS/CO. The first issue is the 
existence of IDPs, who increase the potential for order contestation as a factor 
which could be easily used for destabilization of the internal situation in 
Georgia by internal (political groups) and external (Russia) actors. There are 
about 280,000 registered IDPs in Georgia, which represents about 7% of the 
population (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2019). These include 
internal refugees resettled from Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the 1990s as a 
result of the Georgian-Abkhaz conflict and the Russia-Georgia war of 2008, as 
well as those displaced by natural disasters (e.g., earthquakes). Georgia also 
has some experience with accepting external refugees who are citizens of the 
Russian Federation from the North Caucasus (mainly Chechens). Due to the 
long-term presence of IDPs in Georgian society, there are now also second-
generation IDPs (i.e., the children of those initially displaced). Both the first 
and second generations of Georgian IDPs have Georgian citizenship, but the 
risk of radicalization is higher among them because of the bad economic 
situation. The second dimension is economic migration, which, however, does 
not exceed the scale of that in Ukraine, even after the start of free-visa 
movement between Georgia and the EU. The third dimension of migration in 
Georgia—strictly related to radicalization—is the influx of foreign fighters. 
Since independence, Georgia has been both an importer of foreign fighters, 
mainly during the Georgian-Abkhaz war in the 1990s and the Georgia-Russia 
war of 2008, and an exporter of foreign fighters (Secrieru 2017). According to 
estimates, about 300 Georgians have taken part in the war in Ukraine 
(fighting on the side of Ukraine against Russian “imperial” policy) and more 
than 400 have travelled to Syria and Iraq, most of them seeking to join the 
Islamist radicals primarily as soldiers of the “Caliphate”, but also with 
financial motivations, e.g., as mercenaries (for private military companies 
such as the Wagner Group, which supports Russia/Syria against ISIS).  
3.2.2. Ukraine 
The migration in Ukraine in the context of ALS/CO has three dimensions and 
they all impact on potential for governance breakdown or violent conflict. The 
first one is the case of internal displacement as a result of the 2014 Russian 
aggression against Ukraine. The country has one of the highest numbers of 
IDPs in the world (UNHCR 2020). Since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the 
start of fighting in eastern Ukraine, the government of Ukraine has reported 
some 1.5 million IDPs (Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine 2020). The second 
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dimension is economic migration, which pertains to about 3 million 
Ukrainians who have moved to other parts of Europe since 2014 (mainly to 
Poland). The third dimension is the influx to Ukraine of foreign fighters on 
both sides of the on-going conflict in Donbas (Legieć 2017).  
IDPs increase the possibility of sectoral ALS in health, education, and housing 
policy, where Ukraine is not able to provide for their needs. IDPs fled their 
homes in eastern Ukraine and moved to other parts of the country to seek 
safety. Most of them live not far from their previous home regions: around 
half in government-controlled territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, 
others in Kyiv (210,000) or its surrounding region, or in the Kharkiv (132,422) 
and Dnipropetrovsk (70,414) oblasts. They are exposed not only to economic 
problems (high unemployment, lack of housing, or low integration in local 
communities) (International Organization for Migration 2020), but to 
mistrust from the local population (Kyiv International Institute of Sociology 
2018). Some services for this group (e.g., social assistance, temporary housing, 
medical assistance) are provided by non-government actors, including 
international and civic organizations, as the government is not able to 
provide all needed help. These problems have not yet led to order contestation 
in Ukraine, but if intensified by a low level of resilience, these risks can have a 
severe impact on Ukraine could even lead to new violent conflicts or 
governance breakdowns. 
Economic migration in Ukraine does not constitute a risk of ALS in terms of 
either inflow or outflow of migrants, and the negative outcomes of the 
outflow of workforce are balanced by positive ones in the form of social and 
financial remittances. With regard to inflow, data indicate a quite reasonable 
number of foreign citizens and stateless persons entering Ukraine, which has 
remained almost constant over the last three years. This inflow includes 
immigrants, labour migrants, and visitors to Ukraine. However, Ukraine 
remains one of Europe’s top migrant-sending countries (Fedyuk, Kindler 2016: 
1). Around 5 million Ukrainian citizens are living abroad, permanently or 
temporarily. Estimates vary between 2 and 7 million, depending on the 
definition of migration or the methodology used. The dominant type of 
migration, however, is incomplete migration, characterized by circularity and 
a relatively short period of stay abroad (Piechowska 2020). 
Responses, Resilience, and Remaining Risks in the Eastern Neighbourhood: Radicalisation and Migration 
A. Legucka, J. Benedyczak, A. Legieć, M. Piechowska, J. Pieńkowski, D. Szeligowski 
 






After 2014, Ukraine witnessed a large outflow of workers, mainly to Poland, as 
a result of the declining standard of living in Ukraine (in 2014–2015, 
cumulative GDP decline was more than 16%). The wave of emigration peaked 
in 2017–2018 and stabilized in the next few years (Jaroszewicz 2018). 
Remittances from abroad have significantly increased in that time to more 
than $14 billion in 2018 and have contributed vastly to the economic 
stabilization of the country. Nevertheless, the collateral damage has been that 
the Ukrainian workforce has shrunk by 5–8%, which has resulted in the 
economic recovery being slower than initially expected. Ukrainian 
enterprises increasingly face a labour shortage, with many young and skilled 
workers seeking better job opportunities abroad. Due to the average low level 
of education of the Ukrainian migrants, however, the resulting brain drain 
only affects specific industries (e.g., healthcare and partly in the IT industry) 
(Piechowska 2020). Although many Ukrainians perceive mass-emigration of 
their compatriots as one of the biggest threats to the country (Rating Group 
and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and Razumkov Centre 2018), 
economic migration does not pose risks of governance breakdown or violent 
conflict, mostly due to the fact that Ukrainian migration is characterized by 
circularity and the relatively short duration of migrants’ stay abroad, which 
also lower the threat to the country. 
The impact on the risk of violent order contestation arises from the influx of 
foreign fighters to Ukraine. According to estimates, in 2014–2019 the number 
of foreign fighters engaged in the war in Donbas, including Russians that are 
not part of the regular Russian army, exceeded 18,000 (Legieć 2017). The 
influx of foreign fighters, which was most intensive at the beginning of the 
conflict (2014–2015), was strictly related to the issue of radicalization in 
Ukraine. The conditions of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine have created for 
these people a kind of “ideological traverse” (Legieć 2017: 29) in which anyone 
can fight for whatever they wish and against whomever they choose. 
Choosing sides in the conflict is often a secondary consideration and 
sometimes even coincidental. As long as this conflict lasts, it will be a factory 
producing various radicals fascinated by military life and steeped in brutality, 
increasing the likelihood of governance breakdown or a renewal of violent 
conflict. 
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3.2.3. Moldova  
The Republic of Moldova is the country in Europe most affected by mass 
migration processes, although the categories of internal displacement or 
influx of foreign fighters presented in the previous sections do not currently 
apply. When the Transnistria War started in 1991 and when it escalated in 
1992, many were internally displaced from areas of fighting between 
Transnistrian forces and the constitutional government of Moldova. The most 
intense fighting was in the city of Bender, from which about 80,000 civilians 
fled. After the war, however, nearly all of them returned home (Romanovsky 
2012), so there IDPs are not currently an issue in Moldova. Also, many of the 
numerous volunteers and mercenaries (paid by Russia) who fought on the 
Transnistrian side during the conflict were citizens of other post-Soviet 
republics (mostly ethnic Russians, Ukrainians, but also Kuban, Terek, 
Astrahan, Orenburg, Zaporizhia, Ural, Irkutsk, Zabaikalie, Yakutsia Stavropol, 
and Don Cossacks)(Sukhanin 2019). After the war, however, most of them 
returned to their countries of origin, and the few Cossacks who stayed created 
axillary forces to the Transnistrian army (Solak 2010).  
Since declaring independence in 1991, however, Moldova has lost about a 
quarter of its population—more than 1% of its population per year—not only 
because of the low number of births (about 12.8 per 1,000) but also primarily 
mass-migration. The number of Moldovans currently residing abroad is about 
1 million (IOM 2020), i.e., over 30% of the country’s population. The main 
causes of migration are poverty, the lack of well-paid jobs, and of prospects to 
improve this situation. Moldova, together with Ukraine, remains the poorest 
European state. There is a lack of a formidable middle class, and the gap 
between rich and poor remains at a high level. Most of Moldovan society—
72.9% in June 2020—consider that the economic situation is getting worse. 
Only 7.4% recognized it as satisfactory, but 72% as otherwise. In comparison 
with 2019, only 9.1% found the situation better, but 43.5% worse (Institutul de 
Politici Publice 2020).  
The mass-migration results in growing ALS. Moldova has lost a generation of 
young and middle-aged specialists due to brain drain, so not only are local 
business unable to develop, but the state is not able to fulfil its basic duties to 
its own population. Because of mass-migration, in many villages there are 
schools, kindergartens, houses of culture, or medical centres that have been 
closed or have limited hours. Since Moldovan independence, about 40% of its 
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medical staff have emigrated. Due to this (but also due to lack of funds for 
drugs and equipment), the health of Moldovan society is declining— in 2014 
cases of tuberculosis more than doubled in comparison with 1990, and the 
maternal mortality rate was more than seven times higher than in the EU 
states. A large proportion of emigrants are students—about 20% study abroad 
(90% of them in Romania), and most of them do not return to Moldova after 
graduation (Całus 2016). Mass-migration also causes serious social problems. 
In 2012, more than 100,000 children had at least one parent abroad. In many 
situations, the children were abandoned because grandparents or other 
relatives were not able to (or not interested in) caring properly for them. 
Separated families are exposed to social degradation and mental trauma, 
resulting in a higher number of divorces, juvenile delinquency, and alcohol 
problems (Yanovich 2015) in comparison with families living together. On the 
other hand, about a quarter of emigrants have moved their families abroad, 
which reduces the likelihood they will ever return to Moldova (Yanovich 
2015). 
The Moldovan authorities have tried to manipulate the data to hide the real 
scale of migration by selectively presenting numbers they expect to 
demonstrate their policies will be successful (UNFPA Moldova 2019). 
According to the national census held in 2004, Moldova had 3.38 million 
people, but the 2014 census showed 2.91 million people (in both cases, the 
Transnistrian population was not counted). This shows Moldova had lost 
about half a million citizens in just 10 years. Meanwhile, the Moldovan 
government presented a number of people who formally declared their 
intention to migrate to the authorities as the total number of people who 
emigrated, although citizens have no obligation to do so. For example, in 
2001–2017 the official total of emigrants to Italy, the main EU destination for 
Moldovans, was just 137 people, but in the Moldovan presidential election in 
2016, 51,500 Moldovan citizens voted in Italy (MOLD street 2018). In 2019, the 
National Statistical Office of Moldova published data about net migration. 
Thanks to the use for the first time of international standards of migration 
statistics, short-term migration was excluded. According to this, at the 
beginning of 2019, Moldova’s permanent population is 2.68 million. In 2017 
alone, about 50,000 more people emigrated than returned to Moldova (MOLD 
street 2018). 
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The demographic future of self-proclaimed Transnistria is also uncertain. The 
population of this entity has dropped dramatically since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. It 1991, the year of proclaimed independence, it had 693,000 
residents. In 2004, a local census was organized by the Transnistrian 
authorities, which counted only 555,000 people. In the following years, 
censuses were not taken. In 2018, the local statistical bureau noted only 
467,000 people (Fomenco 2019). According to some researchers, even these 
data are uncertain, and the real population is likely closer to 375,000 (Waal 
2019).  
Nowadays, mass migration is the most important factor deepening the ALS in 
Transnistria by making its economy and institutions inefficient due to lack of 
qualified workers and specialists. Even if the situation in the conflict over 
Transnistria is quite stable and a new war seems unlikely, Transnistrian 
inhabitants emigrate on a large scale. For example, in 2015 the stable 
population may have been 475,000, but officially 55,000 were absent for less 
than one year and 18,000 for one year or more, or about 11% and 3.8%, 
respectively. The main reason for the migration is the unclear political status 
of the region and, due to this, a lack of economic prospects. Its residents 
migrate to search for better-paid work. The depopulation is especially harsh 
in the rural areas, but the outflow of qualified workers and skilled people with 
higher educational degrees has also led to severe brain drain. About two-
thirds of Transnistrian emigrants choose emigration to Russia because most 
Transnistrian citizens have family or a friendly connection in the Russian-led 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which makes work or study there 
easier. Most of them also have dual, or even triple citizenship, the most 
common being Russian. The role of Ukraine as a host state after the Russian 
invasion in 2014 has decreased from about 25% to 10%. Smaller groups have 
moved to Belarus, Romania, Germany, Poland, Bulgaria, or Israel (Fomenco 
2019). 
To sum up, in the EN the risk of governance breakdown or violent conflict due 
to migration processes remains low, but these processes do increase sectoral 
ALS, i.e., the labour market, healthcare system (lack of medical workers), and 
education. It can also intensify CO due to radicalization of groups of people 
and foreign fighters’ activities. While economic migration brings some 
benefits to households in EN countries, in the long term the outflow of people 
weakens the societies and economies of these countries. The most affected 
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country in this context is Moldova, whose mass migration is causing 
depopulation. It is not enough to introduce a migration policy, but the results 
can only bring the resolving of the structural problems of this country. This is 
especially important in the context of increasing the risk of ALS/CO. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Radicalization and migration in the EN countries impact risks created by 
ALS/CO in the region differently. Potential domestic risks that may lead to 
violence or governance breakdown are related to socio-economic 
underdevelopment. High levels of social inequality coupled with widespread 
poverty, a high degree of unemployment, and the presence of rent-seeking 
elites create conditions for social and political radicalization. Under these 
conditions, any major socio-economic shock can act as a tipping point leading 
to violent protests or governance breakdowns. At the same time, issue-driven 
radical actions in the EN are connected with Russian activities in the region as 
well as with domestic actors, like oligarchs, who sponsor far-right activities. 
In Ukraine, issue-driven radicals have not been numerous so far, although 
they may become more widespread in the future given the lack of state policy 
on reintegrating war veterans back into the society and helping them cope 
with their war trauma. Most of the paramilitary groups involved in the 
conflict were included into the Ukrainian Armed Forces, which helped 
mitigate the risk of ALS/CO. Still, political marginalization of radicals may 
bring future escalation. It is still too early, however, to claim that such 
integration efforts have lastingly transformed these societies. Ukrainians and 
Georgians have been able to incorporate radical groups into their political life 
and prevent the repression of radicals, which may have pushed them to 
extremism. Obviously, it is a risky strategy since it may have a longer-term, 
negative impact on the public discourse, including political interactions, as 
well polarizing society even further and pushing the political modus operandi 
to extremes, e.g., by minimising the willingness to seek consensus. Also, there 
are no indicators that right-wing extremist actors in Ukraine, Moldova, or 
Georgia will become a consolidated and powerful movement. At the same 
time, we cannot forget that internal conditions in the EN that affect migration 
and radicalization are related to the activity of the Russian Federation. Even 
with high societal resilience, Russia's military activities in the future may 
again increase the number of migrants and deepen social divisions, 
transforming existing tensions into the radicalization of people. 
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In the EN, migration has slowed but still affects or harms local societal 
resilience and the economic situation through brain drain and the lack of 
workers, in particular in Ukraine and Moldova. In the social sphere, the 
declining working population will bring a demographic crisis and economic 
problems. Ukraine is prominent among these countries with dwindling 
populations and is set to witness an 18% decline in its population by 2050. 
Even if, in the short run, the amount of remittances to Ukraine from migrant 
workers stabilises the macroeconomic situation, the problem in the long run 
will impact the business environment and industrial development. EN 
societies remain highly polarized, and the problems for IDPs (except in 
Moldova) remain significant. Successful reforms, such as those in Georgia, 
have been limited to petty corruption only and elite-level corruption 
continues to undermine the resilience of the EN states. Moreover, 
governments often use the argument of fighting corruption to crack down on 
their opponents in the opposition. Elite corruption in government also 
decreases the country’s resilience by making the government less effective in 
dealing with domestic and external challenges. This results in a less efficient 
and less professional bureaucracy and sub-optimal decision-making at all 
levels of governance.  
Based on empirical exploration of reciprocal interaction between resilience, 
risks, and the role of external actors in the EN, we can draw three broad 
conclusions: first, both Georgia and Ukraine show a basic quality of domestic 
resilience able to withstand some risks and prevent the emergence of violent 
conflicts or governance breakdown. However, due to their vulnerability, the 
EN countries cannot on their own cope with all risks they face, especially 
those associated with their external environment. Second, some risks, mostly 
related to the role of Russia, remain partly unanswered, either by the EU or by 
EN countries themselves, leaving open the possibility of new conflicts or 
governance breakdowns.  
Societal resilience is the most important factor in preventing governance 
breakdown or violent conflict. Across the EN countries studied, the three 
components of societal resilience—social trust, legitimacy, and institutional 
design—vary, and did not prevent governance breakdown or violent conflicts 
in the past, in particular when there was considerable involvement by an 
external actor (Russia). Overall, generalized trust in the EN is relatively low, 
and it is group-based trust that often acts as a source of societal resilience 
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helping EN societies to survive in times of crisis and prevent complete 
governance breakdown. Supplementing group-based trust with generalized 
trust in post-socialist transitional societies has been difficult. It requires 
addressing several long-term socio-political issues which are considered as 
necessary conditions for high social trust. These include a high density of 
civil society and voluntary associations, a low degree of corruption, honest 
and transparent governments, procedural fairness in public institutions, 
equitable distribution of resources, universal social policies, economic 
equality, and equality of opportunities. Also, confidence in state institutions 
in the EN is still very low. Nevertheless, unlike in Moldova, in Ukraine and 
Georgia a national consensus on foreign policy has been maintained; 83% of 
Georgians approve their country's efforts to join the EU, and 78% support 
efforts to join NATO (Thornton and Turmanidze 2018), and at the same time 
83% perceive Russia as a political threat and 72% as an economic danger 
(Center for Insights in Survey Research 2019). Even though the EU and US 
support democratic changes and reform and institutional design (e.g. 
anticorruption institutions), building resilience is largely a domestic process 
where local state and non-state actors take centre stage.  
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